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Abstract
The coevolution of trust in government alongside the growth of government is an aspect of the
latter topic that has not been explored. Moreover, trust is viewed as part of social capital,
facilitating social and economic transactions and the governance of society, and its decline has
caused concern. We consider this coevolution in the context of a political economy model and a
public interest view of government growth, incorporating the role of trust in government.
Though a negative association of the growth in government with trust in government is broadly
consistent with the historical data since the late 1950s, we present an econometrically
sophisticated, time series analysis of the data. We find strong evidence that two aspects of
government size—transfer payments and regulatory activity—align with the political economy
model where government growth erodes trust. Specifically, we find cointegration indicating the
following: negative associations of trust and lobbying activity and of trust and each of these two
measures of government, and a positive association of trust and productivity. Though other
measures of government size do not produce such robust findings, we do not find evidence of
positive associations of trust and government size nor of trust and lobbying, as might be expected
from a public interest view of government.

Steven Gordon
University of Kentucky
Gatton College of Business and Economics
Department of Economics
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
steven.gordon@uky.edu

John Garen
University of Kentucky
Gatton College of Business and Economics
Department of Economics
Lexington, KY 40506-0034
jgaren@uky.edu

J. R. Clark
The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga
313 Fletcher Hall, Dept. 6106
615 McCallie Avenue
Chattanooga, TN 37403-2598
J-Clark@utc.edu

Keywords: trust, government growth

Schnatter Institute Working Papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not
been peer reviewed through the institute. Working Papers present an author’s provisional findings,
which, upon further revision, are likely to be republished in an academic journal. The opinions expressed
in Schnatter Institute Working Papers reflect the views of the authors and may not represent the opinions
of the Schnatter Institute or the University of Kentucky.

The Growth of Government, Trust in Government, and Evidence on Their Coevolution
Steven Gordon, John Garen, J.R. Clark 1

I. Introduction
The growth in government in the United States and other parts of the world has been extensively
researched. Much of this research aims to understand this expansion, but scholars in economics,
political science, and legal studies are often divided regarding the role of government, and its
growth, in economic life. Two contrasting models, the public interest and political economy
views of government, present simple characterizations of this divide and have different
implications for social well-being and economic production as a result of increases in
government activity (Mueller 2004).
Another trend in the United States over the past 60 years that has gained attention is the
decline of public trust in government (Pew Research Center 2010). This decline has caused great
unease among many commentators, with the concern that trust is an important aspect of social
capital and its weakening may detract from the efficacy of government, as well as ease of
economic and social interactions. 2 Social capital encompasses the implicit “rules” of a society
that affect social governance in many ways and perhaps are just as important as written, legal
rules.
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This paper presents an empirical examination that relates these two phenomena, that is,
the mutual evolution of the growth of government on one hand, and the decline in trust of
government on the other. Additionally, our findings speak to whether the public interest or
political economy model is a more compelling viewpoint from which to understand the coevolution of these trends. They also address whether the growth of government has tended to
erode or enhance the trust aspect of social capital. As discussed below, the political economy
model implies a long-run outcome where growth in government erodes trust in government, thus
growth in the former is associated with a decline in the latter. The public interest model suggests
a positive long-run relationship of trust and government growth. Though the raw correlations are
indicative of the political economy model, our empirical work looks for robust, long-run
associations in the data regarding the size of government, trust in government, and other
variables. Because we use time-series data that may be non-stationary, caution must be taken in
the interpretation of correlations, and we are careful to utilize the appropriate time series
methods.
While our analysis is based on the microeconomics of rent-seeking as well as on the
literature on trust, reciprocity, and social capital, we examine neither the details of particular
economic or political markets nor the ebb-and-flow of historical events. Indeed, our approach
abstracts from this level of detail and focuses on economy-wide trends of and associations
among four variables: the size of government, trust in government, lobbying/rent-seeking
activity, and labor productivity. We test whether these variables maintain long-run associations
with one another, that is, if they are cointegrated, and whether the findings are consistent with
either of the above viewpoints. Thus, the paper presents a novel approach that is relevant to the
political economy literature, studies of the growth of government, and work on trust, social
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capital, and social governance. Moreover, it provides new empirical evidence with which to
interpret major economic and social trends.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of
the literature of the growth of government, with discussion of central themes that are closely tied
to the political economy and public interest models. Section III presents the theoretical
discussion and empirical implications of the political economy model as well as the implications
of the public interest view. The role of social capital and trust in government is discussed and
incorporated here. Section IV provides an overview of the data. Section V describes the
econometric analysis and the findings. We specify an empirical model that allows us to examine
the long-run association of, and the dynamics of the relationship between, government size and
trust in government. Using the vector error correction model (VECM), we test for and
characterize the long-run (cointegrating) relationship between trust, government size, and two
other variables that we hypothesize play a role in the dynamic adjustment process: lobbying/rentseeking and labor productivity. When measuring government activity with federal transfer
spending or with pages in the Code of Federal Regulations, our estimates imply the existence of
a long-run association between trust and government size where higher levels of government
lead to lower trust, greater lobbying/rent-seeking, and lower productivity. This is consistent with
the political economy model. Results using other measures of government size do not support the
political economy model, though there is no support for the public interest framework. Section
VI concludes.

5

II. The Growth of Government: A Brief Discussion
This section provides a short discussion of the literature on the growth of government, since it is
one of the phenomena of interest. A good deal of this literature speaks to the above-noted models
of government growth.
In this literature, a worthwhile distinction is made between political and non-political
factors, to use the terms of Holsey and Borcherding (1997); similar terminologies are
institutional and a-institutional factors, used by Borcherding and Lee (2004). 3 Non-political (ainstitutional) factors include the price and income elasticities of demand for public services and
the cost of providing public services. Baumol (1967) argued that the cost of government services
is likely to rise over time and this, in conjunction with a low price elasticity for government
services, may lead to a growth in government. These ideas are supported by empirical work, and
it is well accepted that they have contributed to the growth of the public sector (e.g., Lybeck and
Henrekson 1988; Ferris and West 1993). 4 Wagner’s Law (Wagner 1893), which contends that
government services grow faster that a society’s wealth, suggests a high income elasticity for
government. However, extant empirical work finds a low income elasticity (e.g., Ram 1987;
Gemmell 1990; Henrekson 1990), thus failing to explain the growth of government. Note that
these non-political explanations refer to individuals’ willingness-to-pay for government services
and to the cost of providing them. This suggests efficiency-based reasons for the growth of
government, in keeping with a public interest explanation. As discussed below, public-interest
driven growth of government is expected to foster trust, social capital and implicit social
governance.

3

For more complete discussions of the literature and a full set of references, we refer the reader to Holsey and
Borcherding (1997) and Borcherding and Lee (2004), as well as to Kau and Rubin (2002).
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studies find a low price elasticity for government services; e.g., Perkins (1977) and Gramlich (1985).
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Political (or institutional) reasons for the growth of government focus on political
institutions that may enable rent-seeking and the influence of interest groups in gaining
redistribution. Naturally, this is a reflection of the political economy viewpoint. Perhaps the most
fundamental of these factors is the median voter model. See, for example, Stigler (1970) and the
supporting empirical work of Meltzer and Richard (1983). Peltzman (1980) examines incomebased rent-seeking coalitions, emphasizing both between-group inequality and within-group
equality. Related studies in this vein link the growth of government to expansions of voter
eligibility and changes in electoral rules that may lead to more redistribution. 5 Still others
emphasize the number and size of interest groups, as well as the transaction costs of their
formation (Demsetz 1982; Becker 1983); the role of government bureaucrats (Niskanen 1971);
and Leviathan models (Brennan and Buchanan 1977). Below, we discuss how interest-group
driven growth of government is expected to erode trust and social capital.
A related approach is that of Kau and Rubin (2002), who classify reasons for the growth
of government that stem from citizen/interest group desire for government spending as demand
factors. These include both the political and non-political factors noted above, but also the role
of ideology. 6 They also examine factors that deal with the ease of government tax revenue
collection and its associated dead-weight costs.
Our paper contributes to this literature by incorporating the role of trust in government
into the empirical analysis, a connection that heretofore has not been carefully examined in the
data. Below, we describe the relationship of trust in government to growth of government, with
factors noted above operating in the background.

5
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III. Government and Trust: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Implications
The Political Economy Approach
An important genesis of this work is recognition of the large decline in trust of government over
the past several decades. Pew Research Center (2010) reports that respondents who indicate that
they trust government “most of the time” or “just about always” fell from 76.6 percent in 1966 to
21.5 percent in 2010. 7 This decline in trust of government has been cause for concern among
many commentators, since trust is an important aspect of social capital. Its decline may reduce
the efficacy of government, as well as the efficacy of economic and social interactions, and may
erode the implicit rules of social governance. 8 Notably, this decline in trust occurred during a
period of substantial government growth in the United States, largely in the form of federal
transfer programs and regulatory activity. This presents something of a paradox: How does a
mistrusted institution grow so large? Garen and Clark (2015) synthesize a good deal of the
political economy/rent-seeking literature with trust and social capital literature to understand the
simultaneous growth in the size and influence of government on one hand, and the decline in
trust of government on the other. In this paper, we summarize their synthesis and draw out a
fuller set of empirical implications. 9
The empirical structure to characterize and test is as follows: As a first step, consider the
resource allocation decision for individuals and organizations between devoting time/resources
toward lobbying/rent-seeking activity or toward productive activity. The amounts allocated

7

Many more details are in Pew Research Center (2010). For other discussions of trends in measures of trust in
government for the United States, see Nye, Zelikow, and King (1997) and Hunter and Bowman (1996).
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The appendix reviews the essential structure of the Garen and Clark (2015) synthesis. Note that they draw upon
large and diverse sets of literature on trust, reciprocity, and cooperation; on social capital and productivity; and on
rent-seeking and political economy/public choice. Each is discussed in their paper.
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depend on the private returns to each. Government may provide opportunities for gaining higher
returns to lobbying by, for example, offering favorable regulation or tax breaks/subsidies.
Naturally, these opportunities induce more lobbying. Conversely, greater returns to productive
activity induce less lobbying and more productive effort. Denote the forces that determine the
power of government to induce lobbying by the term Ω 1 . A linear approximation of these
relationships is expressed in the following way:
S = a1 + b1 P + c1 Ω1 + d1Ω2

(1)

where:
S = the amount of lobbying/rent-seeking activity;
P = private sector productivity;
Ω 1 = exogenous factors that enable government to raise the return to lobbying;
Ω 2 = any other exogenous factors that induce more lobbying.
The above discussion entails that b 1 < 0 and c 1 > 0. That is, higher returns to productive activity
reduce S and greater returns to lobbying increase S. We allow for other exogenous influences
that affect lobbying, denoted by Ω 2 , and scale Ω 2 so that d 1 > 0.
In the empirical work we report below, we utilize a proxy measure of economy-wide
lobbying activity as well as standard economic productivity measures. The factors Ω 1 and Ω 2
may be observed or unobserved by the analyst, and we do not attempt to measure them. Note that
these factors encompass the host of political/institutional reasons discussed above that affect the
desire for lobbying (e.g., income distribution, cost of group organization), as well as the power of
government to generate revenue and to grant favors to interest groups.
Government spending, or other activity associated with lobbying/rent-seeking, is a
product of two factors: the amount of lobbying that occurs and the return to lobbying established

9

by politicians. For example, the amount of government spending on a special interest subsidy
depends on the level of subsidization that is available and the amount of lobbying done to gain
the subsidy. Similarly, the degree of regulation that might protect an interest group depends on
the availability (from politicians) of such regulation and the extent of lobbying to obtain it.
Thus, it follows that anything that causes government to increase the return to lobbying,
and anything that otherwise increases lobbying, has a positive effect on the amount of
government activity devoted to lobbying/rent-seeking. Denote this amount as R. Below, we
utilize various empirical proxies for this variable that involve measuring aspects of federal
government spending and regulation. A linear approximation to the above associations is:
R = a2 + b2 P + c2 Ω1 + d2Ω2

(2)

where b 2 < 0, c 2 > 0, and d 2 > 0.
Now consider bringing trust into the framework. Trust and cooperation are linked to
ideas of social capital (i.e., customs, norms, and habits) that assist in social cooperation. 10
Studies have shown the importance of social capital to an economy. 11 Indeed, recent evidence
suggests that trust plays an important role in enabling economic reform (Berggren, Bjornskov,
and Lipka 2015; Berggren and Bjornskov forthcoming). Regarding trust in government, a variety
of reasons are given for its importance. These mostly have to do with cooperation and
involvement in the political process and civic activities, such as jury service, voting, and
willingness to work for the government. In other words, cooperation of the above type helps
government run more effectively.
Also note that government activity may establish and enforce property rights and other
personal rights, maintain contract law, promote competition, deal with public goods, and mitigate

10
11

A succinct summary is Fukuyama (2000).
See Knack and Keefer (1997) as an example.
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externalities. These serve to raise productivity. Trust in and cooperation with government enable
and augment the productivity-enhancing effects of these government functions. For example,
voluntarily compliance with the known parameters of contract and property law limits disputes
and saves on transactions costs. Likewise, cooperation with police investigations makes it easier
to enforce laws and improves property rights. Such cooperative attitudes enable government to
work more effectively, and this raises private-sector productivity.
In this context, trust in and cooperation with government is much like a public good, with
the former raising aggregate social productivity. Thus, one might expect the consequent freerider problem, so it is natural to ask how cooperative attitudes arise in this setting. A great deal of
work has been done in experimental labs trying to understand issues of trust, reciprocity, and
cooperation. Varied laboratory experiments have repeatedly verified that people engage in
reciprocating behavior—trusting and cooperating or withdrawing trust and punishing—even in
one-shot prisoners’ dilemma games where the dominant strategy is to neither cooperate nor
punish. Such findings strongly suggest that behavior is in part determined by perceived fairness,
that is, “fair” behavior by the other party is rewarded and “unfair” actions are punished. 12
Additionally, trust and cooperation are intertwined, with greater trust inducing more cooperation.
Furthermore, there is evidence that individuals apply a related standard to cooperation
with institutions. For example, Levi, Tyler, and Sacks (2008) find that compliance with the law
is dependent on whether the state is viewed as an appropriate authority entitled to be obeyed.
Nadler (2005) shows that the perceived illegitimacy of and noncompliance with one law reduces
the willingness to comply with law in general. Other research obtains similar results regarding
compliance with or trust in government. Various studies find that non-cooperative attitudes toward

12

Fehr and Gachter (2000) provide a succinct summary of these experimental results. See also Henrich, et. al.
(2001) and Hayashi et. al. (1999).
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government are engendered by perceived inefficiency of government, heavy influence of special
interests, misconduct by government officials, and perception of poor macroeconomic policy. 13
Overall, these findings link to the ideas of reciprocity and cooperation as social norms and
suggest that these norms are applied to government. If government is perceived to be effective,
this perception is reciprocated with trust and with cooperation. If it is not, trust and cooperation
are withdrawn.
These findings regarding trust and productivity are summarized by the following firstorder approximations. Define T as trust in government. Then:
T = a3 + b3R + c3Ω3

(3)

where b 3 < 0, indicating that an increase in the lobbying/rent-seeking activities of government
reduces trust in government. The term Ω 3 represents other exogenous factors (observed or
unobserved) that increase trust and c 3 > 0 follows from the definition of Ω 3 .
The final equation, based on the foregoing discussion, involves productivity, P:
P = a4 + b4T + c4R + d4Ω4

(4)

The coefficient b 4 > 0 follows from the idea that the social capital associated with trust in
government raises productivity. The coefficient c 4 < 0 is based on standard arguments that
aggregate rent-seeking/lobbying activity, R, reduces aggregate productivity. The term Ω 4
represents other factors (observed or unobserved) that raise productivity, with d 4 > 0.
Equations (1) through (4) represent the structure of the model that is, the economic
causes and effects among the variables of interest S, R, T, and P. These are the endogenous
variables that are determined by the simultaneous solution of the system. This solution depends
on factors outside the model: Ω 1 , Ω 2 , Ω 3 , and Ω 4 . Now, solve for the endogenous variables in

13

See, for example, Blendon et al. (1997), Pharr (2000), and Alesina and Warcziarg (2000).
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terms of these outside exogenous factors. The exhibit below summarizes the effect (positive or
negative) of each exogenous variable on the endogenous variables. These are the predictions of
the political economy model of government activity.

Exhibit 1. Effects of outside factors on the endogenous variables: Political economy model
Ω 1 : exogenous Ω 2 : exogenous Ω 3 : exogenous Ω 4 : exogenous
factors raising factors raising factors raising factors raising
the return to
lobbying
trust
productivity
lobbying
S: lobbying
positive
positive
negative
negative
R: government activity
supporting lobbying
positive
positive
negative
negative
T: trust in government
negative
negative
positive
positive
P: productivity
negative
negative
positive
positive

Notice that, regardless of the source of exogenous shocks, clear patterns emerge
regarding how endogenous variables are expected to covary. Lobbying, S, and government
support of lobbying, R, always move together. Similarly, trust, T, and productivity, P, always
move in the same direction. Finally, S and R move in the opposite direction of T and P. Also
notice that the political factors inducing government growth, as well as other influences on
productivity and trust, operate in the background through the exogenous variables Ω 1 , Ω 2 , Ω 3 ,
and Ω 4 . As we describe in more detail below, this framework implies that, in a time series
setting, the four endogenous variables are cointegrated. Whatever the source of exogenous
shocks to the system, these variables are predicted to move together over time as described.
Thus, our approach enables us to abstract from the specifics of individual policies, historical
events, and individual economic or political markets, focusing instead on the economy-wide
associations of key variables.
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An Alternative Framework
The Public Interest View
The main alternative framework we consider is the public interest view, where government
consistently acts in the best interests of the citizenry. Here, greater discretion for government is
utilized to raise productivity, engender trust in government, and enable lobbying that helps bring
forth this type of policy.
Denote these “good” aspects of government as G and let L represent lobbying activity to
increase G. Let Ψ 1 be factors that increase the power of government to allocate resources and/or
respond to lobbying requests and Ψ 2 be other factors that may influence government spending
and lobbying. Then the above discussion suggests:
L = a5 + b5 Ψ1 + c5 Ψ2

(5)

G = a6 + b6 Ψ1 + c6 Ψ2

(6)

where b 5 , c 5 , b 6 , and c 6 are all positive. Notice that the non-political factors discussed in the
literature on government growth enter here. Change in the demand for government services is
encompassed by the term Ψ 2 , that is, factors that increase G and lobbying for G.
The public interest view implies that increases in the power of government generate G
that raises trust in government and improves productivity. This is expressed as:
T = a7 + b7G + c7Ψ3

(7)

P = a8 + b8G + c8Ψ4

(8)

where b 7 and b 8 are positive, Ψ 3 and Ψ 4 are outside factors raising trust and productivity,
respectively, and c 7 and c 8 are positive.
As above, we solve for the endogenous variables in this framework. This leads to the
findings summarized in Exhibit 2. We find that shifts in Ψ 1 and Ψ 2 alter L, G, T, and P so that
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they all move together. If these are the predominant sources of shocks in a time series of data,
then L, G, T, and P are cointegrated and each has a positive relationship to the other. If changes
in Ψ 3 and/or Ψ 4 are the major sources of shocks then no comovement is implied. In this case,
each affects only one endogenous variable in the system—T and P, respectively—with no effects
elsewhere. It is under the former set of shocks that cointegration of lobbying, government
activity, trust, and productivity are expected. However, the nature of the cointegration is very
different than that of the political economy model.

Exhibit 2. Effects of outside factors on the endogenous variables: Public interest model
Ψ 1 : exogenous Ψ 2 :
Ψ3:
Ψ 4 : exogenous
factors raising exogenous
exogenous
factors raising
the powers of
factors raising factors raising productivity
government
lobbying
trust
L: lobbying
positive
positive
zero
Zero
G: government activity
positive
positive
zero
Zero
T: trust in government
positive
positive
positive
Zero
P: productivity
positive
positive
zero
positive

A Simplified Version
A somewhat different version of the public interest framework is the view that the dominant role
of government is to step in to deal with adverse shocks to an economy or society. This is readily
expressed as a simpler version of equations (5) through (8). Let Φ denote factors that negatively
shock trust and productivity. Suppose that government acts in response to these shocks by raising
G and that this serves to offset these negative shocks to T and P. This yields the following
relationships:
G = a9 + b9Φ

(9)

T = a 10 + b 10 Φ + c 10 G

(10)

P = a 11 + b 11 Φ + c 11 G

(11)
15

with b 10 < 0 and b 11 < 0, indicating negative shocks to T and P, c 10 > 0 and c 11 > 0, indicating a
positive effect of G on T and P, and b 9 > 0, signifying that G rises to offset the shock. (Note that
lobbying does not enter this version of the model.)
The solution for the endogenous variables shows no unambiguous associations among
them. A shift in Φ generates clear movements in G, but T and P may move up or down in the
same or in a different direction from G and from one another. There is no cointegration implied
among these three variables.
Consider an interpretation of this model in terms of the interest group model of equations
(1) through (4). A simple modification makes the two frameworks more consistent. Suppose that
trust in government depends on the ratio of R to G, where an increase in the ratio lowers trust
and a decrease raises it. This is consistent with trust equation (3) in the interest group model and
trust equation (10) in the public interest framework. Likewise, with productivity dependent on
the R to G ratio, productivity equations (4) and (11) become consistent.
This suggests that we ought to have separate measures of R and G, though this requires
determining which aspects of government are “good” and which are “bad.” Instead, our approach
is to utilize various measures of government and let the nature of cointegration of government
with the other variables inform us of the predominant character of the government activity. If we
find cointegration with negative associations of government to trust and to productivity, the
interest group model is predominant. If there are positive associations, the public interest
framework dominates. Our emphasis on cointegration of the four endogenous variables of
interest enables us to focus on just those variables, with the various exogenous factors that affect
the growth of government acting in the background.

16

IV. Data
Our goal is to examine the inter-relationships among a host of variables that proxy for the
phenomena of interest. We do so to assess how consistent the data are with the above
frameworks. This section presents an overview of these variables.

Figure 1. Percent of respondents who trust government “most of the time” or “just about
always”

Source: Pew Research Center, http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/

Our measure of trust in government is from Pew Research Center data. These data are a
compilation of surveys undertaken by several polling organizations and summarized in a
standardized fashion. They cover the years 1958 to 2014. 14 We focus on the percentage of
respondents who indicate that they trust government “most of the time” or “just about always.”
Figure 1 shows a plot of these data. This measure of trust in government peaked in 1966 at 76.6

14
These data are used in Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2010) and are summarized at
http://www.people-press.org/2014/11/13/public-trust-in-government/. For years that more than one survey was
taken, we use the average percent. In some years, no survey of this nature was conducted. In these cases, we enter
interpolated data. In the earlier years, such surveys are available for roughly every other year. Since the mid-1970s
there is a survey for almost every year.
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percent, began to fall markedly, and by 1979 was at 29.0 percent. In subsequent years, the
number has ebbed and flowed. Table 1 displays summary statistics for the trust variable, as well
as for other variables discussed below.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Trust
Political organizations (payrolls)
Political organizations
Labor productivity
Code of Federal Regulations
Sum of top 5 regulation titles
Transfer payments
Federal outlays
Federal outlays less defense

Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
41.30
76.60
18.60
16.61
45.36
73.49
31.82
11.75
0.06
0.11
0.04
0.01
64.90
104.51
35.00
19.88
91,013 155,788
37,680
36,925
38,893 76,618
14,311
18,389
0.07
0.11
0.04
0.02
0.19
0.24
0.16
0.02
0.14
0.20
0.08
0.03

Notes: All variables in levels. Sample period is from 1960 to 2013 for all variables with the exception of the
average marginal tax rate (1960 to 2012). Political organization payrolls as a percentage of total payrolls scaled by
a factor of 1 million is a two-year moving average. The labor productivity index has a base year of 2009 = 100.
Government spending variables (Federal outlays, Federal outlays less defense, and transfer payments) are all as
percentages of GDP. Code of Federal Regulations and the sum of the top five titles of the Code of Federal
Regulations are raw counts of the number of pages.

Regarding the size of government, we use several measures of government spending, as
well as indicators of federal regulation. The spending variables are: federal outlays as a
percentage of GDP; total federal outlays less defense spending as a share of GDP; and federal
transfer payments as a share of GDP. The total spending measure makes no distinction between
the types of federal spending. In subtracting defense spending in the second measure, we are
distinguishing defense from non-defense spending. Naturally, the focus of the third measure is
transfer spending.
Figure 2 shows the familiar time path of federal outlays as a share of GDP. There was a
sizable, albeit somewhat erratic, increase through the 1960s and 1970s, a substantial period of
decline through much of the 1980s and 1990s, and a large increase in the 2000s. Figure 3 shows
18

the plot for federal transfer payments as a share of GDP. This series is similar to the data on
overall federal outlays, but with some exceptions. It shows a fairly steady increase in the 1960s
and 1970s, a period in the 1980s and 1990s with little trend, and then a resumption of the upward
trend in the 2000s. The correlation between federal transfer spending and total spending is 0.68.

Figure 2. The evolution of federal outlays as a percent of GDP over time

Figure 3. The evolution of transfer payments as a percent of GDP over time
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Figure 4. Percent “mistrust” of government and federal outlays/GDP

Note: Variables are each normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Figure 5: Percent “mistrust” of government and federal transfers/GDP

Note: Variables are each normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.

To gain a sense of relationships in our data, in figure 4 we plot federal outlays as a share
of GDP against the data on trust. For illustrative purposes, we plot “mistrust” instead of “trust.”
The former is simply 100 percent minus the percent trust measure. Also, to put variables on the
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same scale, we normalize them so each has 0 mean and standard deviation 1. As can be seen,
these two time series move together quite closely. Their correlation coefficient is 0.65. Figure 5
does a similar plot, but with mistrust against federal transfers as a share of GDP. Visually, these
variables track each other very closely. Their correlation coefficient is 0.91.
To measure federal regulatory activity, we use the number of pages in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Dawson and Seater (2013) argue that the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) is a more precise approximation to the level of regulation than other measures such as
pages in the Federal Register. 15 The page count of total regulations is used to capture both the
amount of government regulatory intervention and its complexity, since both more regulations
and more complicated regulations should require a greater number of pages. The CFR includes
all regulations and is broken into 50 separate titles, with each title covering a different subject
area. 16 We also experiment with using the five titles with the largest number of pages of
regulations. These regulatory areas are: environment, wildlife, and fisheries; agriculture; banks
and banking; transportation; and labor.
Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the regulation variables. The mean pages in
the CFR is over 91,000, varying from a minimum of 37,680 to a maximum of 155,788. The
former value occurred at the beginning of the sample and the latter at the end. Figure 6 plots
normalized values of total CFR pages against normalized mistrust. The pattern of CFR pages
shows a sizable growth in the 1970s, a slowdown in the early 1980s, a decline in the mid-1990s,
and a resumption of growth during the 2000s. Comparing the two time series plots suggests a
strong relationship. The correlation of mistrust and CFR pages is 0.80.

15

However, our data collection shows that the correlation between pages in the Federal Register and the Code of
Federal Regulations is very high at 0.89.
16
The first six titles of the CFR are excluded because they focus on the internal workings of the federal government.
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Figure 6: Mistrust and pages in the Code of Federal Regulations

Note: Variables are each normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.

As a proxy for rent-seeking activity, we follow Sobel and Garrett (2002) by using data on
the lobbying industry. County Business Patterns reports the number of establishments,
employment, and total payroll of the industry “political organizations,” which is NAICS industry
code 81394. These data are available each year beginning in 1959. 17 For our proxy, we use
political organizations payrolls as a percentage of total U.S. annual payrolls, scaled by a factor of
1 million. 18 Additionally, a two-year moving average is used in order to smooth out election year
spikes that take place in even years.
We do not claim that our measure captures all the lobbying activity that occurs in the
economy. Indeed, much is likely to take place within firms that operate in a multitude of

17

The years 1960, 1961, and 1963 were missing and were imputed based on historical trends.
We also experimented with using political organizations employment <<<If possessive, add apostrophe. If not,
suggest recast as employment in political organizations>>> as a percentage of total employment. The findings were
very similar.
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industries. However, we do rely on the assumption that the size of the lobbying industry is
closely correlated with the total lobbying activity in the economy. Table 1 shows the summary
statistics and figure 7 plots our lobbying measure against mistrust, both normalized. As seen,
lobbying rose sharply during the 1980s, slowed in the mid-1990s, rose again in the mid-2000s,
then fell again. Mistrust and lobbying tend to move together, though it does not seem as close as
with other associations. The correlation coefficient is 0.52.

Figure 7: Mistrust and political organizations payrolls

Note: Variables are each normalized to have mean 0 and standard deviation of 1.

Regarding productivity, we rely on data for labor productivity from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. In particular, we use the non-farm labor productivity index, with a base year of 2009.
It is an index of output per hour and its summary statistics are found in table 1. Labor
productivity displays a consistently upward trend, though the growth rate does vary. Thus, it
would appear to be inversely related to the generally downward-trending trust; indeed, the
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correlation coefficient is -0.73. However, our multivariate analysis below shows that this is
misleading.
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of variables of interest. Many of the correlations
were noted above. Generally, trust has a negative correlation with each of the measures of the
size of government, as well as with lobbying. Additionally, lobbying is positively related to the
measures of government.

Table 2. Correlation coefficients

Trust
Labor productivity
Political organizations
Transfer payments
Federal outlays less defense
Code of Federal Regulations

Trust
1.00
-0.73
-0.53
-0.91
-0.89
-0.81

Labor
Political Transfer Fed. outlays Code of Federal
productivity orgs. payroll payments less defense Regulations
-0.81
-0.73
-0.53
-0.91
-0.89
0.96
1.00
0.89
0.88
0.77
0.83
0.89
1.00
0.64
0.52
0.91
0.88
0.64
1.00
0.95
0.87
0.77
0.52
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.96
0.83
0.91
0.87

Notes: All variables in levels. Transfer payments and federal outlays less defense spending are all as a percentage of
GDP.

V. Econometric Framework and Findings
Econometric Issues
Our discussion above focused on understanding the observed empirical associations between
trust in government, size of government, lobbying/rent-seeking activity, and productivity. Here,
we describe the framework for and results regarding analysis of the variables discussed in the
data section.
To investigate these associations, we face the challenge that the variables of interest may
be non-stationary. As is well known, spurious correlations among non-stationary variables are
more likely to occur than standard statistical inference suggests. All of these series exhibit trends,
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and possibly the presence of non-stationarity. Here, we discuss and apply the appropriate
methods to determine the legitimate associations in our data.
Table 3 displays the results from a battery of tests for non-stationarity (i.e., unit root
tests). All of the series show mixed evidence for the presence of unit roots. However, the power
of these tests tends to be very low and the multiple tests shown provide contradictory evidence
regarding whether many of the series contain unit roots. 19 Thus, the evidence does not
overwhelmingly support either the acceptance or rejection of unit roots. Because of this, we take
an approach that does not rely on stationary data.

Table 3. Unit root test results
DF-GLSi
Test
Trust
-0.70
Political organizations (payrolls)
-0.60
Political organizations (employment) -1.61
Labor productivity
1.24
Code of Federal Regulations
1.49
Sum of top 5 regulation titles
2.22
Transfer payments
0.52
Federal outlays
-1.31
Federal outlays less defense
-0.33
Average marginal tax rate
-1.77

DF-GLSit
-2.33
-2.48
-3.47
-1.51
-1.50
-1.54
-1.61
-2.18
-1.50
-1.89

KPSSi
0.78
0.74
0.86
0.92
1.04
1.06
0.81
0.47
0.69
0.20

KPSSit
0.10
0.16
0.12
0.12
0.18
0.13
0.19
0.13
0.20
0.17

Perron1
< 0.01
0.70
0.01
0.95
< 0.01
0.01
0.61
0.50
0.42
< 0.01

Perron2
0.47
0.73
0.52
0.57
0.44
< 0.01
0.68
0.56
0.68
0.28

Notes: The DF-GLS and Perron tests both have a null hypothesis of a unit root, while the KPSS test has a null
hypothesis of stationarity. Critical values for the DF-GLS assuming level stationarity are -1.61 (10 %), -1.95 (5 %),
and -2.61 (1 %) respectively, and -2.87 (10 %), -3.17 (5 %), and -3.75 (1 %) assuming trend stationarity. Critical
values for the KPSS tests assuming level stationarity are: 0.347 (10 %), 0.463 (5 %), 0.739 (1 %) and 0.11 9 (10 %),
0.146 (5 %), 0.216 (1 %) for trend stationarity. The Perron1 and Perron2 tests are based on the Perron (1989) unit
root testing procedure with possible breakpoints and represent different approaches for the selection of break dates:
Perron1 is the test with the selected break that yields the greatest chance of rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit
root, while Perron2 represents the test where the most statistically significant break is chosen. Critical values for the
Perron1 and Perron2 tests assuming trend stationarity with both trend and intercept breaking are -4.89 (10 %), -5.18
(5 %), and -5.92 (1 %), and -4.28 (10 %), -4.62 (5 %), and -3.03 (1 %) respectively. Subscripts “i” and “t” denote
that the test specifications include an intercept or a trend respectively.

This approach is to test for cointegration of the variables of interest: trust in government,
size of government, lobbying/rent-seeking activity, and productivity. The political economy

19

We also do some stationarity tests that allow for the presence of breaks.
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model implies that these variables always move together in certain ways. Even though each
variable may be non-stationary, the relationship among them remains the same. Thus, the
variables are expected to be cointegrated with certain associations among them. Similarly, the
public interest framework, under certain conditions, implies cointegration but with different
associations.
This is expressed in the following way. Let the long-run relationship among these
variables be:
T t = µ + β LP LP t + β POL POLt + β X X t + υ t

(12)

where T t is our trust variable, LP t is labor productivity, POL t is the political organizations
payroll variable, X t is the size of government variable, and υ t is an error term. If (12) is the true
long-run relationship, then υ t is stationary and (12) represents the relationship that the series
reverts back to in the long run. The β j coefficients define the long-run associations among the
four variables. Our political economy model predicts that T and LP move together, POL and X
move together, and the first pair move opposite to the second pair. This implies β LP > 0, β POL <
0, and β X < 0. Note that the cointegrating equation may be normalized to any of the variables and
we have normalized trust to have a coefficient of 1.
Additionally, if cointegration in (12) holds, then error correction should occur. Thus, if υ t1

= T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POLt-1 – β X X t-1 – µ > 0, trust in period t-1 is higher than expected and

should fall in the ensuing period. The opposite holds if υ t-1 < 0. This is expressed in as:
ΔT t = γ 1 + α 1 (T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POL t-1 – β X X t-1 – µ) + ε 1t
(13)
where α 1 is the adjustment coefficient – expected to be negative – and ε 1t is white noise. This is a
simple version of the error correction model. A full version of this framework is the vector error
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correction model (VECM). This allows for adjustment in all of the variables, controls for lagged
changes, and also estimates the cointegrating coefficients simultaneously with the adjustment
coefficients.
The full model that we estimate is:
ΔT t = γ 1 + α 1 (T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POL t-1 – β X X t-1 – µ) + Γ 1T ∆T t-1 + Γ 1LP ∆LP t-1 +
Γ 1P ∆POLt-1 + Γ 1X ∆X t-1 + ε 1t

(14)

ΔLP t = γ 2 + α 2 (T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POL t-1 – β X X t-1 – µ) + Γ 2T ∆T t-1 + Γ 2LP ∆LP t-1 +
Γ 2P ∆POLt-1 + Γ 2X ∆X t-1 + ε 2t

(15)

ΔPOLt = γ 3 + α 3 (T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POL t-1 – β X X t-1 – µ) + Γ 3T ∆T t-1 + Γ 3LP ∆LP t-1 +
Γ 3P ∆POLt-1 + Γ 3X ∆X t-1 + ε 3t

(16)

ΔX t = γ 4 + α 4 (T t-1 – β LP LP t-1 – β POL POL t-1 – β X X t-1 – µ) + Γ 4T ∆T t-1 + Γ 4LP ∆LP t-1 +
Γ 4P ∆POLt-1 + Γ 4X ∆X t-1 + ε 4t

(17)

Estimation and Results
Before turning to the final estimation, we test the data for the existence and number of
cointegrating relationships, as well as the appropriate lag length in equations (14) through (17).
To do so, we follow the procedure of Johansen (1991) to test for the existence of cointegrating
relationships among trust, labor productivity, political organizations, and each measure of
government activity. The lag length is chosen based on Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion
(SBIC), and is found to be one lag for all series. This, and the tests for number of cointegrating
relationships, are summarized in table 4. For each of the measures of government, the null
hypothesis of zero cointegrating relationships is rejected, but the null of one cointegrating
relationship is not.
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Table 4. Tests for cointegrating relationships
Government Variable
0
1
Transfer payments
Federal outlays less defense
Federal outlays
Code of Federal Regulations
Sum of top 5 titles of the
CFR
Average
marginal tax rate

0.0028
0.069
0.0301
0.007
0.0759
0.0246

0.2391
0.5811
0.31
0.3125
0.4834
0.1019

2
0.5388
0.5955
0.5242
0.3328
0.5048
0.1479

Notes: Values displayed are from cointegration tests following the Johansen (1991) methodology. Each government
variable is included in with the same set of endogenous variables: Trust, labor productivity, and political
organizations. Displayed numbers are p-values for the trace test statistics. Lag length is chosen based on Schwarz’s
Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and is one lag for all series. All tests were specified with a linear trend in the
data, and an intercept only in the cointegrating equation.

Table 5. Vector error correction model estimates
Parameter
TP
CFR
Panel A: Cointegrating coefficients
βT
1
1
γ1
-3.48
-16.22
βLP
-0.59
-2.92
[-1.165] [-2.590]
βPOL
1.1
3.46
[2.924]
[5.044]
βX
0.71
1.02
[2.395]
[1.917]
Panel B: Adjustment coefficient for trust
α1
-0.25
-0.12
[-2.471] [-2.361]

FEDDEF
1
-4.86
-0.73
[-1.105]
1.51
[2.735]
0.74
[1.540]
-0.18
[-2.091]

Notes: Measure of government activity, X = TP, CFR, or FEDDEF. All variables in log levels. T- statistics in
brackets. Panel B includes only the equation for ∆T as the dependent variable. TP = Transfer payments/GDP, CFR =
Code of Federal Regulations, FEDDEF = Federal outlays less defense spending/GDP. Each specification also
includes lagged changes of: the measure of government activity (∆X t-1 ), Trust (∆T t-1 ), Labor productivity (∆LP t-1 ),
and Lobbying (∆POL t-1 ).

Table 5 presents the main findings. Note that we use the logarithm for each variable for
all specifications. For estimation, the cointegrating equation is expressed as T t – µ – β LP LP t –
β POL POL t – β X X t – υ t = 0. Thus, the signs of the estimated parameters are opposite their
associations with trust.
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Panel A presents cointegrating coefficients. In the first column, government is measured
as TP; transfer payments relative to GDP. The sign pattern is as the political economy model
predicts: Labor productivity is positively associated with trust, and the political organizations
variable and transfer payments are negatively associated with trust. The latter two show strong
statistical significance, while the first does not. In panel B, the error correction coefficient is
reported from the trust adjustment equation (α 1 ). This coefficient is negative and significant as
expected. This finding implies that a lagged level of trust higher than the long-run relationship
produces a reduction in trust and produces the converse for a lagged level below the long-run
association. The coefficients in the other change equations were mostly statistically insignificant
and so are not reported here.
The second column displays analogous results, measuring government activity using the
number of pages in the CFR. The sign pattern of the cointegrating coefficients is the same as
above: Trust and productivity are positively related, and political organizations and government
size are negatively related to trust. The coefficients on productivity and political organizations
are highly significant, while that on the CFR has a p-value of about 6 percent. Additionally, the
estimated adjustment coefficient for trust adjustment shown in panel B is negative and
significant.
The last column of table 5 shows the findings for another measure of the size of
government: federal outlays less defense spending as a share of GDP. The cointegrating
coefficients in panel A show that the sign pattern remains the same, indicating that trust and
productivity move together and in the opposite direction of lobbying and government size. In this
specification, however, statistical significance is weaker, with only the lobbying variable
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attaining a high level of significance. The adjustment coefficient for trust in panel B has a
negative sign and is statistically significant, similar to the above findings.
We also experimented with other measures of the size of government: total federal
spending as a share of GDP and pages of the CFR for the highest five areas. For the
cointegrating coefficients, the results are somewhat varied, though usually with sign patterns
similar to those in table 5, but often without statistical significance. However, regardless of our
measure of government, we find little evidence that trust, government size, lobbying, and
productivity move together as the public interest model predicts.
Our findings imply that transfers payments as a share of GDP and pages in the CFR
behave as though they represent rent-seeking related government activities, in that the
cointegrating and adjustment relationships are as predicted by the political economy model. We
do not find such robust relationships for other measures of government, though none behave as
expected by a public interest view of government.

VI. Conclusion
The coevolution of trust in government alongside the growth of government is an aspect of the
latter topic that has not been explored. Our study examines it from a broad, economy-wide
perspective. We find strong evidence that two aspects of government size—transfer payments
and regulatory activity—exhibit persistent long-run association with trust in government as well
as with other relevant variables. Specifically, we find cointegration indicating the following: a
negative association between trust and lobbying activity, a negative relationship between trust
and each of these two measures of government, and a positive association between trust and
productivity. Various other measures of government size do not produce such robust findings.
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The former findings align with the political economy model and suggest that these aspects of the
growth in government have eroded trust in government. We find no evidence of positive
associations between trust and government size and trust and lobbying, as might be expected
from a public interest view of government.
While seemingly paradoxical, the negative association between growth of government
and trust in government is consistent with a political economy/rent-seeking view of government
growth and also is broadly consistent with the sweep of historical data since the late 1950s. With
the more econometrically sophisticated examination of the data reported in this paper, we find
this view is confirmed with respect to two measures of government, though not with respect to
others.
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Appendix
This appendix outlines the synthesis of Garen and Clark (2015) that underlies equations (1)
through (4).
For individuals or individual organizations, let the following definitions hold.
h = effort in productive activity, e.g., hours of work
(1- τ)w = the after-tax return to productive activity, where τ is the tax rate
s = effort in political support activity
r = the return to each unit of political support activity, assumed not to be subject to tax
t = degree of trust in and cooperation with government
C(h,s) = the utility cost of effort. Assume that there is increasing marginal cost of each type of
effort (C ii >0, i=h,s) and C hs >0
Let the individual’s utility function be:
U = (1-τ)wh + rs – C(h,s) + βt - φ(t)

(A1)

The first two terms are the after-tax income from work and the payoff from political support
effort, respectively. The third term is the utility cost of effort. The last two terms represent the
individual’s benefit and cost of trust in and cooperation with government.
The final two terms originate from the experimental and psychology literatures as
discussed above and reviewed in Garen and Clark (2015). This literature implies that individuals
gain utility from cooperation with persons that they judge as being worthy, and that this
sentiment is applied to government. The final terms in the utility function (A1) reflect this.
This is incorporated into the model as follows: The marginal benefit of trust/cooperation
is given by the parameter β, implying that better government generates higher values of β. Define
G as government spending on the value-enhancing aspects of government; denote aggregate

36

political support activity as S; and so rS is total government support of rent-seeking. Let
β=G/(G+rS) so that the marginal utility of cooperation with government rises with the share of G
in total spending and falls with rS. This captures the essence of the foregoing arguments that
cooperation ensues from value-enhancing government, and the converse from government
activity that generates political activities.
The individual chooses work effort (h), political support effort (s), and cooperativeness
(t) to maximize utility. It is also assumed that each individual has an infinitesimal effect on
economy-wide aggregates and so are taken as given. It is straightforward that political support
effort (s) rises with r and falls with w. This is true for the individual and in aggregate. With
productivity (P) as a proxy for w, and Ω 1 representing r, this yields equation (1) in the text,
where S rises with Ω 1 and falls with P. This also implies text equation (2), where total rentseeking government support rises with Ω 1 and falls with P.
From the utility maximizing choice of t based on (A1), it is straightforward that
individual and aggregate trust fall with aggregate government support of rent-seeking relative to
G. With R representing government support of rent-seeking, this is expressed in text equation (3)
where T is a declining function of R.
Finally, recall from the foregoing discussion that functions of government such as
establishing and enforcing property rights, maintaining good contract law, promoting
competition, and dealing with public goods and externalities raises productivity. Also from the
foregoing, the literature indicates that citizen cooperation with government enhances these
productivity-augmenting effects. This is expressed in the following way: Denote the aggregate
level of trust of and cooperation with the government by T, then:
(A2) w = w(G,T), with w G > 0, w T > 0, and w GT > 0
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Again, with P as a proxy for w, this implies that productivity rises with T and falls with rentseeking government, R. This is as expressed in equation (4). Thus, each of equations (1) through
(4) are consistent with the Garen and Clark (2015) synthesis.
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